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This article has three objectives. The first is to assess the sig­
nificance and field of operation of the rule of non cumul in 
comparative law of tort. The second is to review certain Mal­
tese judgments to establish whether our courts apply this 
rule. The third is to highlight the bad effects of the prevailing 
lack of clarity and to argue in favour of reform. To the unini­
tiated, this may seem a fairly arcane topic with few practical 
implications. However I aim to show that it lies at the heart of 
certain thorny dilemmas faced by advocates when instituting 
court proceedings for civil damages. 
'Non cumul' in Comparative Law of Tort 
The rule itself is easy to define. There are certain factual sit­
uations which give rise to an overlap of contractual and tor­
tious responsibility, so that the plaintiff would appear to have 
the choice whether to institute an action for damages under 
tort or under contract. Massimo Bianca I gives two examples:
a surgeon who conducts an operation carelessly and incom­
petently and the buyer of a home appliance containing a la­
tent defect, which provokes a fire damaging the buye.is apart­
ment. In the first case, the patient has suffered an infringe­
ment not only of his contra.,.ctual right to the diligent execu­
tion of professional services, but also of his right qua citizen 
not to have his h�th endangered by the negligent activities 
of others.2 In the second, the buyer would appear to have a
right of action for damages in tort in addition to his contrac­
tual right to take action to remedy the effects of the seller's 
breach of his warranty against latent defects. In these situations 
of concurrent responsibility, it is a general principle of French 
law that the plaintiff has no option but to take a position on 
the contractual terrain and take action on the basis of breach 
of contract. This rule is applied very strictly, so as to restrict the 
plaintiff in such cases to legal action of a contractual charac-
ter and to exclude any possibility of listing both contractual 
and tortious claims in the writ.3 Moreover in these situations,
even if the contractual remedy is no longer available because 
of prescription, the plaintiff may still not exercise the action in 
tort.4 
The raison d'etre of the rule of non cumul largely derives 
from the importance which French law gives to the auto�?my 
of the wl_ll of the contracting parties.After all, the contract may 
clearly state whether the parties should or should not have 
a choice of action in the event of concurrent responsibility 
between contract and tort. In such cases jurists5 agree that 
it is the contract that will determine the matter. However the 
contract itself is usually silent about this issue in the standard 
case of non cumul. In this case it is assumed that the parties 
must have intended to exclude the possibility of an action in 
tort since they chose to regulate the relationship between them 
by means of a specific contractual regime, which supersedes 
the more generic protection of tort law. Similar rules also apply 
to a different, albeit comparable, situation: where one of the 
parties to a contract has committed actions that, while they do 
not constitute a breach of contract, would normally constitute 
a tort. Here too, the principle of respect for the will of the con­
tracting parties leads French authors to conclude that the avail­
ability of an action in tort depends on the reasons for which the 
parties have omitted to include specific contractual provisions 
regulating the situation. If they have done so because they 
specifically intended to exclude the possibility of both con­
tractual and non-contractual remedies, then an action for dam­
ages in tort will not be allowed. If, however, the omission of 
the parties derives from their understanding that the situation is 
already catered for in terms of general legal principles, then a 
remedy in tort will be available.6 Analogously, the rule of non
cumul is justified as a necessary outcome of the intentions of 
Massimo Bianca, C., (1994), Diritto Civile Vol. V, Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, Milano. 
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It should be kept in mind that the Italian Constitution speaks of the right of citizens to healthcare. 
In fact, Mazeaud & Chabas argue that it would be preferable to speak of the rule of choice of action instead of non cumul. See Chabas, F., 
(1998), Lerons de Droit Civil, (Leon, H., Mazeaud, J., Chabas, F.), Montchrestien, P aris. 
See Nicholas, B., (1996), The French Law of Contract, OUP, Oxford, p. 173. 
Chabas, F., ibid, p. 403. 
Thus Mazeaud & Chabas, ibid, argue that in a contract of sale of a shop, the buyer need not include a clause obliging the seller to avoid 
spreading malicious rumours after the sale that aim to prevent potential buyers from buying from the shop. A seller who acts in this way 
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the parties, who have freely decided that their relationship will 
be regulated by a contr�tual regime. 
It is important to note that this rule appears to be specific 
to French law of tort. If one looks at English and Italian law, 
it is clear that this rule is not applicable. As Cane7 observes,
explicitly contrasting English and French law: 
As a general rule, English law allows concurrent liability in 
contract and tort. This means that if D's conduct constitutes 
both a tort against P and breach of contract between P and D, 
P may choose to sue D either in tort or in contract (or in both) 
in respect of that conduct.8 
Cane justifies the English position as more flexible and rea­
sonable than the unduly formalistic French approach. He also 
argues that a judicial preference for an action based on con­
tract law can no longer be justified on the grounds that con­
tracts are the product of the free choices of the parties. Many 
of the legal effects of contracts arise regardless of the choices 
of the contracting parties. 
Italian authors make similar points. Thus Massimo Bian­
ca9 notes that there is no objective incompatibility between the
specific protection of the parties' interests which contract law 
provides and the more generic protection provided by the law 
of tort. Torrente 10 adds that the parties who enter into a con­
tract certainly do not intend to thereby renounce to the gener­
al protection of their primary rights under tort law. There is 
therefore no reason to deny the possibility of concurrent lia­
bility. The injured party should be permitted to choose to act 
either via contract or via tort and the judge is obliged to respect 
this choice. Moreover, the exercise of one of these actions does 
not constitute an implicit renunciation of the other, although 
once compensation for damages is obtained through one ac­
tion the other will lapse.11 Finally, in these cases, the plaintiff
is also permitted to sue for damages without stating whether 
he is acting on the basis of tort or breach of contract. The judge 
would have the discretion to determine which type of action 
is being exercised. 
One should also note that German law follows the English 
and Italian approach and accepts concurrent liability. The ori­
gins of this approach have been traced to Roman law, which 
also, it seems, permitted the plaintiff to choose between tort 
and contract in such cases. 12 
Maltese Court Decisions 
Court decisions are an indispensable guide in order to deter­
mine whether the rule of non cumul exists in our law. After all 
in France this rule was developed by the courts, since the 
Code Napoleon, like our civil code, is silent on this issue. One 
could argue that this rule exists in our law since Maltese law 
of obligations is closely modelled on French law and we also 
give primary importance to the autonomy of the will of the 
contracting parties.13 However, it is equally possible to assert 
that non cumul does not apply in Malta, since our civil law is 
ultimately based on Roman law, which apparently did not rec­
ognize this rule (cf. supra). In the absence of statutory regu­
lation, it remains possible to argue that our position has con­
tinued to be regulated by Roman law.14 In the face of these
would be incurring tortious responsibility in line with general principles and the buyer can therefore sue the seller for damages in tort de­
spite the existence of a contract between them. By contrast, if the parties to a contract of deposit stipulate that the depositary is only li­
able in culpa lata for his custody of the thing deposited with him, then the depositor may not institute the ordinary action for damages in 
tort on the basis of the culpa laevis of the depositary. In the latter case it is clear that the contracting parties have specifically excluded 
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the possibility of an action in terms of general principles of tort. 
Cane, P. (1996), Tort Law and Economic Interests, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Ibid, p. 311 
Bianca, M., op. cit., p. 552 
10 Torrente, A. & Sclesinger, P., (1997), Manuale di Diritto Privato, Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, Milan, p. 663. 
11 If the exercise of one of these actions is no longer possible due to prescription, the plaintiff may still exercise the other. Italian case deci­
sions have therefore accepted the possibility of making an action in tort against the seller of a thing containing a latent defect, despite 
the fact that the time limit for the exercise of the contractual action for breach of the warranty against latent defects had expired. This 
is because the purpose of the action in tort is not to obtain the economic advantage deriving from adequate performance of the contract, 
but to obtain the compensation to which the buyer is entitled for the injury which she has personally suffered. Bianca, M., op. cit., p. 554. 
12 Massimo Bianca quotes a passage from the Digest attributed to Ulpian: Proculus ait, si medicus servum imperite seceurit, vel ex locato
vel ex Lege Aquilia competere actionem, Bianca, M., op. cit., pp. 552-3. (Translation: 'Proculus states that if a medical doctor has negligently 
performed his professional services in regard to a slave, he can be sued either on the basis of locatio conductio or of the lex Aquilia').
13 Mallia, T., (2000), 'Pre-Contractual Liability in Malta', Law & Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 26. 
14 On this point, it is worth quoting the opinion of Judge Paolo Debono, cited by the Court of Appeal in the leading case of Cassar Desain
50 
v. Forbes:
the precept of the Code de Rohan that, whenever a dispute cannot be decided by the provisions of the Municipal law, regard must be
had to the (Roman) common law, has never in civil cases been repealed and is still applied.
He adds that 
the common law to which the Code refers, is less that which is derived from the Corpus Juris than that which was modified by the 
Canon law as expounded by the writers and accepted by usage in the Courts. 
See the decision of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 7th January 1935 in Marquis James Cassar Desain v. James Louis Forbes, CBE,
nomine, cited in Gulia, Wallace Ph., Governmental Liability in Malta, (1974), University Press, Malta. 
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conflicting arguments, it is the courts that should provide au­
thoritative guidance. Yet while we do have a few case deci­
sions that apparently apply this rule, they do so in a confus­
ing and inconsistent way. Three separate approaches can be 
identified in our case decisions. 
The 'Consequentialist' Approach of Vassallo v. Miz.z.i 
An important case in this context is Mary Vassallo v. Giovan­
ni Mizzi et., decided by the Civil Court on the 9th April 1949 
(Vol. XXXIII. II. 379).15 In this case, the plaintiff had leased
a dwelling house from the defendant. Part of the roof of this 
house was unsupported by regular beams (xorok). This creat­
ed an aperture in the roof, which was provisionally covered 
by a wooden plank. Defendant neglected to repair the roof 
although this was his legal obligation as lessor and plaintiff 
claimed that she had often requested him to do so. Subsequent­
ly, plaintiff suffered a theft of money and some valuables 
from the house and it was proven that the thieves had gained 
access to the property through the roof aperture. She therefore 
sued defendant for compensation for the damages she had suf­
fered as a result of his negligence. In its judgment, the court 
observed that it was unclear from the writ of summons whether 
the negligence being attributed to defendant was based on tort 
or on breach of contract. After reviewing the differences be­
tween contract and tort, the court concluded that the plain­
tiff had intended to request contractual damages, as: 
L-aperturafis-saqaf allegata tal-kamra mikrija mhix inkoncil­
jabbli mal-prevedibbilita ta' dak Ii seta' jigri u gara, cjoe s­
serq; u l-istess nuqqas ta' riparazzjoni, tant bhala obbligu tal­
lokatur Ii jitnissel mill-kuntratt tal-lokazzjoni, kemm btzala t­
traskuragni tiegnu allegata non ostanti l-insistenzi tal-attrici
biex jirriperah, huma vjolazzjf)ffi tal-kuntratt, Ii kellha btzala
konsegwenza diretta s-serq lifilfatt gara; u skond il-gurispru­
denza, meta lfattijiet kolpuii Ii jsorgu fi-okkaijoni ta' kun­
tratt ikunu prevedibbili meta dak il-ftehim isenn, u huma l-kon­
segwenza diretta tal-vjolazzjoni tal-kuntratt, l-azzjoni eierci-
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tata ma tistax tkun dik tal-ntija akwiljana, iida dik tal-ntija 
kontrattwali.16
Up to this stage, the court's reasoning might be interpreted as 
a fairly straightforward application of the rule of non cumul. 
After all, the court made a prima facie assessment of plain­
tiff's claim to establish whether it could fall under the law of 
contract and found that it could. This being the case, it held 17 
that it had no option but to consider the claim as being of a 
contractual nature. However, this reasoning bears closer inves­
tigation in view of the nature of the test used to determine that 
the action could fall under the law of contract. Here two crite­
ria were mentioned: firstly that the damages caused were a di­
rect consequence of the violation of the contract and second­
ly that these damages were foreseeable at the time when the 
contract was made. Actually both these criteria are usually re­
quired under Maltese law for the court to find that damages 
are payable to compensate for breach of contract.18 They ap­
pear to be irrelevant to the task of determining whether the 
action stems from a breach of contract in the first place. 
The significance of this objection can be grasped if we 
consider the case where a breach of contract causes damages 
that were not foreseeable at the time when the contract was 
originally made. If we apply the test used in Vassallo v. Mizzi, 
then we would have to conclude that any action for compen­
sation of such damages could not be based on breach of con­
tract. An action in tort would therefore have to be made.19
However it is equally clear that, if the courts are to apply the 
rule of non cumul, they may not allow an action in tort to be 
made by one contracting party against the other for compen­
sation of the damages arising from an act which constitutes a 
breach of their contract. After all the rule of non cumul, as it 
exists in France, compels the plaintiff to take action for breach 
of contract in these cases of concurrent responsibility, even if 
the contractual action is prescribed. Indeed, French authors 
admit that this rule tends to work against the victims who have 
suffered damages.20 Moreover, it is a basic principle of French
15 All case decisions cited in this paper are taken from the Kollezzjoni Deciijonijiet tal-Qrati Superjuri ta' Malta, published by Legal (Pub­
lishing) Enterprises. Volume and page numbers are listed in brackets after each case. All the Civil court decisions mentioned in this paper 
were delivered by the First Hall of the Civil court, a fact which I deem it superfluous to mention in my citations. 
16 Ibid., p. 381
17 The court referred to previous court decisions that reached the same conclusions. However I have been unable to trace these decisions, as
they were not cited in the judgment. 
18 These principles are contained in sections 1136 and 1137 of our Civil Code. Section 1136 states that
The debtor shall only be liable for such damages as were or could have been foreseen at the time of the agreement, unless the non­
performance of the obligation was due to fraud on his part. 
Section 1137 adds 
Even where the non-performance of the obligation is due to fraud on the part of the debtor, the compensation in respect of the loss 
sustained by the creditor, and of the profit of which he was deprived, shall only include such damages as are the immediate and di­
rect consequence of the non-performance. 
Cf. Nicholas, B., op. cit., pp. 224-32 
19 The possibility of making an action in tort in certain cases of negligent breach of contract may be deduced a contrario from the wording
of the quoted extract from the judgment. 
20 'Puisqu'elle leur a refuse de pouvoir apter pour les regles qu'elles auraient interet a invoquer', Chabas, F., op. cit., p. 404. 
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and Maltese civil law that the question whether contractual re­
sponsibility has been incurred is treated separately from the 
rules which establish whether and to which extent the damages 
caused by the act which gives rise to contractual responsibil­
ity can be compensated.21 Thus, if the rule applied by the court
in Vassallo v. Mizzi was that of non cumul, then we would have 
to conclude that the test proposed by.the court for determin­
ing whether contractual responsibility exists was incorrect, in­
sofar as: 
a. it failed to distinguish the issue of the existence of con­
tractual responsibility from the rules establishing the quan­
tum of damages compensated and
b. it implied that one contracting party could sometimes make
an action in tort against the other party for the damages
arising from a breach of their contract, although this is
precisely what the rule of non cumul forbids and although
this would effectively circumvent section 1136 of the Civil
Code.22 
It may be objected, however, that the court in this case had 
n_2. desire..to applµhe rule of.1Wn cUHtUl. After all the judg­
ment contained no reference to French doctrine or jurispru­
dence. Other interpretations might be available which better 
explain the court's reasoning. What if the court believed that 
the non cumul rule does not apply to Malta and was simply 
trying to find the most appropriate remedy for the plaintiff, 
given that there was concurrent liability and that she had not 
clearly identified the nature of her claim for damages? If that 
were so, then the court's decision to treat the case as one of 
breach of contract rather than tort would simply be based on 
its desire to interpret the plaintiff's claim in the manner which 
was most favourable to her. The test proposed by the court is 
consistent with this interpretation, as the two limbs of this test 
constitute, as has been observed, the legal requirements which 
contractual damages must fulfil to be compensated. However, 
this interpretation is contradicted by the words used in the 
judgment, which stated that the court in such cases has no dis­
cretion as the claim cannot be considered as one of tort and 
also by the outcome of Vassallo v. Mizz.i. In fact the final out­
come of this case was actually negative for the plaintiff as the 
court rejected her claim for damages, partly on the grounds 
that she had failed to convincingly prove his fault and partly 
(and highly significantly) since, 'def resto, la kien hemm dak 
il-mezz.u bejt flok ix-xriek, ma kienx ordinarjament previdib­
bili ghal Michelangelo Mizz.i li minnu seta 'jsir serq' .
23 
At first sight this comment, which forms part of the ratio 
decidendi of this case, appears rather puzzling. Having ini­
tially decided, for classification purposes, that the possibility 
that the aperture in the roof of the leased property could have 
facilitated the theft was 'not incompatible' with the principle 
that the damages claimed must have been foreseeable at the 
time of the making of the contract of lease, the court now 
cheerfully observes that in this case, however, the theft was 
not 'ordinarily' foreseeable by the parties! In order to make 
sense of this final comment, it is necessary to infer that the 
court is proposing a two-stage test in cases of concurrent li­
ability. In order to determine whether the claim is for breach 
of contract, it will undertake a preliminary review of the facts 
of the case in order to establish whether the damages could 
conceivably have been 
a. directly caused by the breach of contract and
b. foreseeable at the time of making of the contract.
If the facts as stated in the writ of summons permit this inter­
pretation, then the case must be classified as breach of con­
tract. At this stage, the plaintiff must actually prove that the 
facts were in reality a direct consequence of the breach of con­
tract and were truly foreseeable at the time when the contract 
was made. However this two-stage test appears highly artifi­
cial and unworkable. How, in practice, can one distinguish be­
tween a preliminary review of the facts that concludes that the 
damages caused could have been foreseeable at the time when 
the contract was made and a definitive assessment of the facts 
that concludes that the damages caused were foreseeable at 
that time? 
To understand why the court attempted to construct this 
two-stage test, it is important to highlight another undesirable 
consequence of its misplaced reliance on the legal criteria 
governing the payment of contractual damages in order to 
classify the action as based on contract or on tort. An action 
satisfying these criteria must ipso facto be one where the court 
believes the damages plaintiff suffered should, according to 
the law, be compensated. Therefore, if these criteria are used 
to classify the action, the case ought, logically, to be decided 
in favour of the plaintiff whenever an action for damages is 
classified as arising from a breach of contract. The prelim­
inary classification of an action as contractual would neces­
sarily imply that the court is also accepting that the defendant 
is liable to pay damages for breach of contract. Clearly the 
court evolved the two-stage test in an attempt to wriggle out 
21 This is why the writ of summons in such cases normally contains two separate requests: firstly that the defendant be declared responsible 
for the damage caused and secondly that the actual damages s/he is liable to pay be quantified and the defendant condemned to pay them. 
On this point Nicholas has a very interesting discussion. See Nicholas, B., op. cit:, pp. 211-13. 
22 Section 1136 restricts the damages payable for a negligent breach of contract to those that were foreseeable at the time when the contract 
was made. Note that the case being considered here is different from the issue, discussed further on, as to whether a third party to a con­
tract may sue one of the contracting parties in tort for an act which constitutes a breach of contract. 
23 
Vassallo v. Miui, op. cit., p. 382. 
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of these implications of its position, which would have great­
ly reduced its discretion by making it impossible for it to both 
classify an action as contractual in nature and also to find that 
damages could not be awarded.24 In terms of this test, it is
clear that not every classification of an action as one for con­
tractual damages must lead to the defendant being found li­
able to pay damages in compensation. 
In any event, the rejection of the plaintiff's claim partly on 
the strength of one of the special rules of contractual respon­
sibility puts paid to any notion that the court's categorization 
of the claim as one of breach of contract was motivated by the 
desire to find the most favourable solution for the plaintiff. The 
court's position in this case cannot be assimilated to either 
the Italian or the French position. If an Italian court had de­
cided this issue, it would - unlike the Maltese court- have 
considered itself free to find that the action was one of tort 
although the damages arose from an act which also consti­
tuted a breach of contract. If a French court was faced with 
this case, it would have considered the action as being con­
tractual not because of the nature of the damage caused, as 
the Maltese court argued, but simply because it allegedly arose 
from an act which constituted a breach of contract. The rea­
soning of the Maltese court appears close to the French posi­
tion, with the difference that the French courts first apply a clas­
sificatory principle and then deduce its logical consequences, 
while the Maltese court tried, by artificial and unworkable 
criteria, to deduce the classificatory principle from its conse­
quences .25 
The implications of this judgment can be better under­
stood if we look at a more recent case that applied the same 
'consequentialist' reasoning. In fact, Vassallo v. Miu,i was 
cited in Pauline Fenech v. Emmanuel Baldacchino noe, de­
cided by the Civil Court on the 20th March 1992 (LXXVI. 
ill. 568). In this case, the plaintiff had bought a villa from the 
defendant. When the contract of sale was finalized, the defen­
dant failed to deliver to her all the keys of the property, leav­
ing another set of keys in the hands of third parties. She claimed 
that when she visited the villa after the sale, she found some 
furniture missing and on a subsequent visit she encountered 
some persons inside the villa who assaulted her and robbed her 
of a sum amounting to LM45 ,000 .00. She therefore sued the 
plaintiff to obtain compensation for the damages she had sus-
24 
Which is what the court decided in this case. 
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tained. In his statement of defence, the defendant argued that 
the alleged theft was purely a figment of the plaintiff's imag­
ination. 
In this case too, it was unclear from the writ of summons 
whether the alleged liability of the defendant derived from 
tort or breach of contract and the court again used its discre­
tion to ascertain the legal basis of the action. After reviewing 
the facts of the case, the court held that the action was con­
tractual in nature, being based on the claim that the defen­
dant's non-delivery of all the keys of the villa constituted a 
breach of his contractual obligation to ensure the defendant's 
peaceful possession of the property. The court discarded the 
possibility of an action based on tort for various reasons, 
which were primarily: 
1. At no stage did the plaintiff allege that defendant was
guilty of any criminal misbehaviour in her regard, either
in his own name or in complicity with others.
2. Neither did plaintiff claim that defendant intentionally
or fraudulently refrained from performing his contrac­
tual obligations towards her.
3. According to our case decisions, when the damages aris­
ing from a breach of contract were foreseeable at the time
when this contract was finalized and are a direct conse­
quence of the breach, the resulting action for compensa­
tion of these damages can only be contractual in nature
and cannot be based on tort.
The third reason for considering plaintiff's claim as contrac­
tual is subject to the same criticism which has been directed 
at Vassallo v. Mizzi, from which it was explicitly derived. How­
ever the other two reasons are also misleading and merit fur­
ther investigation. Indeed, the argument that the action could 
not be based on tort because the defendant had not been simul­
taneously accused of committing a criminal offence could only 
hold water if there existed a general principle limiting the right 
to claim civil damages in tort to those instances when the tor­
tious act also allegedly constitutes a criminal offence. Yet this 
is clearly incorrect, because it is universally accepted that the 
civil and the criminal actions are independent of one anoth­
er.26 Secondly, it is also irrelevant for the purposes of classi­
fying an action under contract or tort whether the defendant 
acted fraudulently or negligently. After all, a breach of contract 
may be committed intentionally and our law recognizes the 
25 
The consequences being whether or not damages could be compensated in this case. For an original discussion of the role of consequen­
tialist reasoning in judicial decision-making, see the chapter on 'Reason, Intent and the Logic of Consequence' in Rosen, L., The An­
thropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society, (1996), University Press, Cambridge, pp. 39-57. 
26 
Thus Caruana Galizia observes 
The concept of tort or delict in civil law is different from that of crime .. . very often, though not always, a crime is at the same time 
a tort or a quasi-tort; but even then the two actions which are given rise to, the penal action and the civil action, must be kept distinct. .. 
the two actions are instituted, dealt with and judged upon separately and independently one from the other. 
Caruana Galizia, V., (rev. Ganado, J.M.), Notes on Civil Law Laws Ill Year, (1978), University Press, Malta, p. 310. 
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existence of a category of quasi-tort,27 which consists precisely 
of unjust acts which are negligently committed. Since it is pos­
sible to commit either a tort or a breach of contract either neg­
ligently or intentionally, it is clear that the intentional element 
cannot be the criterion by which claims are classified as con­
tractual or tortious. Yet the court's reference to the intention­
al element in this context is significant, as it reveals how close­
ly it followed in the footsteps of Vassallo v. Miu.i in relying on 
the rules concerning the quantification of damages to estab­
lish responsibility and how, in the process, it was led up a blind 
alley. In fact our law provides that in cases of fraudulent breach 
of contract, the damages awarded to the creditor are all the dam­
ages which are the immediate and direct consequence of the 
debtor's non-performance, not limited by the requirement that 
they should have been foreseeable at the moment of conclu­
sion of the contract.28 This contrasts with the case of a negli­
gent breach of contract, when the damages awarded are re­
stricted by the requirement that they must have been foresee­
able at the moment of conclusion of the contract. In Fenech
v. Baldacchino, it seems that the court imported this distinc­
tion between fraudulent and negligent breach of contract from
the field of quantification of damages and tried to use it to de­
termine whether the action was based on contract or tort. In
the process, the court came close to considering an inten­
tional breach of contract as being a kind of tort, observing:
Konsegwentament ma hemm xejn fi-atti Ii jista' jissuggerixxi 
illi l-attrici qed tit/ob xi risarciment ta' danni 'ex delictu' jew 
'quasi delictu', in kwantu wkoll ma jirriiultax ... Ii l-attrici qed 
timputa lill-konvenut Ii hu naqas Ii jadempixxi l-obbligazzjoni­
jiet tieghu kontrattwali b' dolo u bil-hsieb Ii attwalment jar­
rekalha danni.29
The court did not consider the possibility that the defendant's 
carelessness in neglecting to deliver all the keys of the villa 
to the plaintiff might constitute a quasi-tort. Its failure to con­
sider this option, which could have materially influenced its 
judgment, was a result of its over-reliance on the rules reg­
ulating the quantification of contractual damages, which led 
it to misrepresent the true nature of the distinction between 
contract and tort as based on whether the defendant had acted 
negligently or intentionally. 
Even when it came to determine whether and to what ex­
tent damages were payable, the court in Fenech v. Baldacchi-
27 See sections 1031, 1032 and 1033 of our Civil Code. 
no faced the same obstacles which had been encountered in 
Vassallo v. Miui and tried to surmount them by similar strate­
gies. Once again, the difficulty was that the court had appar­
ently already decided that damages were payable, since it had 
held that the damages caused were foreseeable in order to 
justify its classification of the claim as coiftractual. The court · -­
overcame this difficulty partly by holding that plaintiff had 
failed to provide adequate proof that she had really suffered 
the damages she claimed and partly by arguing that since the 
damages she allegedly suffered were foreseeable at the time 
when the contract of sale was finalized, she should also have 
foreseen and taken steps to protect herself from the eventual 
theft of her property.30 However, this latter argument lacks a 
secure legal basis as the general rule in cases of liability for 
negligent breach of contract is that the defendant is liable 
for all foreseeable·damages which are an immediate and direct 
consequence of his actions. Moreover, the court was clearly 
unhappy with its own line of argument, since at a later point 
in the judgment it pointed out that it was impossible for the 
defendant to have actually foreseen the theft!31 
These shifting and inconsistent criteria can all be seen as 
attempts to compensate for the 'original sin' committed in 
Vassallo v. Miui and repeated in Fenech v. Baldacchino, of 
relying on the rules regulating the payment of contractual 
damages for the logically prior task of determining whether 
the action made should/must be considered as contractual in 
origin. In both cases, the court found against the plaintiff. In 
Vassallo v. Miui the court had to invent an artificial two-stage 
test of foreseeability to arrive at this conclusion. In Fenech
v. Baldacchino, the court evoked this test and tried to give it
weight by evolving additional criteria, which also appeared
to lack a secure legal basis. In both cases, a French court would
probably have arrived at the same conclusion, but it would
simply have held that the presence of a contractual element
requires the case to be classified as contractual in nature, leav­
ing the court free to conclude that the damages caused could
not be compensated as they were not foreseeable at the time
when the contract was concluded. This is clearly a more log­
ical and consistent approach. The same could be said for the
Italian approach, which would probably have allowed the
court to find that the plaintiff's action was based on tort in
either of these cases.
28 In terms of section 1136 of our Civil Code, op. cit. cf. Nicholas, B., (op. cit., p. 229) for French law of contract 
The debtor, therefore, whose fault does not amount to dol is liable for such direct damage as was foreseeable; the debtor who is guilty 
of dol is liable for all direct damage, whether foreseeable or not. 
29 See Fenech v. Baldaccino, op. cit., pp. 572-73.
30 Ideally by not turning up at the villa carrying LM45,000.00 in her hands a few days after she became aware that third parties had access
to the property! 
31 Op. cit., p. 575.
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( Mis-)Applying the Principle of Subsidiarity 
Other Maltese judgments also seem to apply the rule of non 
cumul, without however invoking the consequentialist rea­
soning of Vassallo v. Mizzi. In this regard, an intriguing judg­
ment was delivered only a month before Fenech v. Baldacchi­
no in Anthony Vella noe v. Alan Clifford Jones, decided by 
the Civil Court on the 28th February 1992 (LXXVI. ill. 542). 
In this case, the defendant had entered into a konvenju32 agree­
ment to buy an apartment belonging to the plaintiff. He claimed 
that on the strength of this agreement defendant had given 
him specific instructions to buy tiles of a certain type and to 
perform certain repairs to the property. After he had alleged­
ly incurred expenses amounting to LM796.00, defendant failed 
to honour the konvenju, since he did not take action to final­
ize the contract of sale within the time period in which the 
konvenju could have been enforced. Plaintiff therefore claimed 
that defendant had incurred a pre-contractual liability to com­
pensate him for the expenses he had made.33 Defendant ob­
jected that key facts alleged by the plaintiff were untrue and 
that his claim had no legal basis. 
In its judgment, the court observed that plaintiff had not 
taken any action to enforc<!the konvenju within the period in 
which he was legally entitled to do so.34 Therefore:
Hu ovvju Ii dan kien ir-rimedju Ii kien miftuh lill-attur nomine 
biex jikkawtela d-drittijiet tieghu Ii l-ligi taghtih biex jargina 
kull telf jew danni riiultanti mill-allegata inadempjenza tal­
konvenut. Il-Qorti ma tarax taht liemafigura legali l-attur no­
mine jista' javvanza pretensjoni ghall-kundanna ta' danni pre­
kontrattwali meta, ex admissis, ma uiufruwiex mir-rimedju Ii 
l-ligi stess taghtih ex contractu.35
Thus the court reasoned that once a contractual action to en­
force the konvenju was available and had n!l! been utilized 
by plaintiff, he could n� now sue for pre-contractual dam­
ages. This is an interesting statement, for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, because it implies that pre-contractual liability in Mal­
tese law is founded on tort and not on contractual grounds.36 
Secondly, because it might appear to be a very direct appli­
cation of the doctrine of non cumul. It is worth pointing out 
that in this case the court made no reference to the test de-
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veloped in Vassallo v. Mizzi. Instead of asking whether the 
damages caused to the plaintiff were foreseeable at the time 
when the konvenju was finalized, the court simply noted that 
an unutilized contractual remedy had been available. The mere 
existence of this contractual remedy which had not been availed 
of and despite the fact that it was no longer available to plain­
tiff, was held to preclude him from making an action for dam­
ages in tort. This appears to be almost identical to the French 
position. Finally, however, a margin of doubt remains whether 
the court was applying the rule of non cumul in its entirety or 
some other principle. After all, the court might have meant 
to imply that pre-contractual liability is based on quasi-con­
tractual grounds, in which case the principle applied could not 
be that of non cumul.37 Moreover, the quoted extract might be 
read to imply that it is the fact that plaintiff had not initially 
attempted to utilize the contractual remedy, not its mere ex­
istence, which prevented him from exercising the action in tort. 
This interpretation is suggested by another case, which 
could also be considered as relating to concurrent responsi­
bility: Frederick Frendo noe v. Godwin Abela noe et, decid­
ed by the Court of Appeal on the 24th October 1989 (LXXI­
Il. TI. 601). In this case, plaintiff had entered into a contract with 
the Cargo Handling Company, represented by the defendant 
Godwin Abela; in terms of which this company engaged to 
unload merchandise from his ship, the Veliko Tirnovo. The 
company had in tum subcontracted part of the work to the 
second defendant, a certain Meli, who had to supply the heavy 
equipment needed to unload the merchandise. It seems that 
the delivery of this heavy equipment was delayed. In con­
sequence the stevedores (burdnara) requested an increased 
payment, over and above their official tariff, from the plain­
tiff, arguing that the workers had to take an excessive amount 
of time in order to unload the merchandise. They brought their 
claim before the Port Disputes Board, which ordered the plain­
tiff to pay an additional sum of LM343 .20 to the stevedores. 
The plaintiff in tum sought to recover these additional ex­
penses by suing both Meli as well as the Cargo Handling 
Company (as represented by Godwin Abela) for the dam­
ages caused to him by their delay in unloading the ship. The 
32 
The colloquial term for a written document containing a unilateral promise to sell, together with a unilateral promise to buy immovable 
property. 
33 
Since he had initially expressed the desire to buy the property and then failed to appear on the final contract after plaintiff had incurred these 
34 
expenses•. 
It is unclear from the judgment whether this refers to the legally stipulated period oft� months from the day on which the agreement 
could have been enforced, (see section 1357(2), Civil Code) or to a conventional period stipulated by the parties. 1 
, 
35 
Vella v. Jones, op. cit., p. 544. 
36 
In fact, in the above-quoted extract, the court explicitly contrasted pre-contractual liability to a contractually based remedy. This is a sig­
nificant contribution to the debate on the juridical basis of pre-contractual liability, on which see Mallia, T., op. cit., and Xuereb, G ., 'A 
Comparative Study of the Theory of Precontractual Responsibility', in /d-Dritt, published by the Ghaqda Studenti tal-Ligi. 
37 
As this principle only operates in the case of concurrent liability between contractual and tortious responsibility. The overlap between 
contractual and quasi-contractual responsibility is governed by the principle of subsidiarity, discussed further on in this paper. 
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case came before the Commercial Court, which decided that 
plaintiff's action against the Cargo Handling Company, which 
was based on breach of contract, was time-barred in terms 
of section 45(b) of the Ports Ordinance (1962).As regards his 
action against the second defendant, (Meli), the court held that 
the plaintiff had no right of action against him, because there 
was no contractual link between them; Meli being a subcon­
tractor of the Cargo Handling Company and not of the plain­
tiff. 
Plaintiff appealed, arguing inter alia that his claim for dam­
ages from Meli was based on tort and not on contract. There­
fore it was not necessary for him to establish a contractual 
connection with Meli in order to sue him for damages and his 
action was not time-barred in terms of the Ports Ordinance. 
However the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, observ­
ing that: 
1 . appellant had based his claim purely on contractual grounds 
in his writ of summons; 
2. given that there was no contractual link, the action for dam­
ages should not and could not have been made in the first
place against the defendant Meli; and
3. since Meli had entered into a contract with the Cargo Han­
dling Company and since the plaintiff's right of action
against the Cargo Handling Company, with which he re­
ally had a contractual tie, had expired through prescrip­
tion, it is inconceivable that he should have retained the
same right of action in regard to Meli, with whom he had
no legal relationship whatsoever.
Clearly the court in this case applied a principle which was 
similar to that applied in Vella v. Jones. In both cases, the ex­
istence of an action for breach of contract which was not 
availed of was held to prevent plaintiff from making an ac­
tion for damages in tort. Yet is this principle the same as the 
rule of non cumul? Doubts may arise due to the particular 
facts of this case as well as the way in which the court ex­
pressed its judgment. Significantly in this case the contrac­
tual action was exercisable against one person, while the claim 
in tort was directed against another. In all the other cases of 
concurrent responsibility which have been reviewed, the con­
tractual and tortious actions overlapped because they were 
potentially exercisable in regard to the same person. Admit­
tedly, some authors argue that concurrent liability can also 
arise when the act which causes damage is imputable to more 
than one person on different legal grounds.38 However, the
justification of the non cumul rule lies, as has been observed, 
in the fact that the particular parties involved had previous­
ly decided to regulate their relationship by means of a con­
tract. This justification is missing where, as in this case, there 
is no previous contractual relationship between the plaintiff 
and the person being sued in tort. Thus it is unlikely that the 
French courts would have extended the application of the rule 
of non cumul to a case like Frendo v. Abela. 
These doubts are reinforced by the way in which the court 
chose to describe the principle it was applying. In denying 
the plaintiff the right to take action in tort against the second 
defendant, the court highlighted the fact that his contractual 
action against the first defendant had expired through pre­
scription. This fact should not be taken into account if the 
court is applying the rule of non cumul. The court's duty 
should be limited to ascertaining whether or not a contrac­
tual action was originally available to the plaintiff. If this was 
the case, then he cannot be permitted to make an action in 
tort, whether the contractual action was still available or was 
time-barred. Moreover, the court also stressed that in this case 
the action in tort could not be availed of in the first place.39 
This curious expression seems to have no foundation in the 
non cumul rule, since this rule completely and permanently 
prevents the plaintiff from taking action in tort once a con­
current contractual liability exists. 
One way of explaining the court's approach would argue 
that it relied heavily on precedents found in English law. In 
fact there exist various comparable cases in which the Eng­
lish courts have denied the possibility of making a claim in 
tort and this on the strength, not of the principle of non cumul, 
but of the doctrine of privity of contract. The central argument 
is that in cases where X, a party to a contract with Y, has sub­
contracted the performance of some or all of his contractu­
al duties to another person, Z, then this subcontract is a res 
inter alios acta to the original contracting party Y, who is not 
a party to the subcontract and cannot benefit from it. Y can­
not therefore be allowed to sue Z in tort, as this would mean 
that one is effectively allowing him to circumvent the doc­
trine of privity of contract.40 One should note, however, that
although the English courts used to argue in this way in the 
38 Massimo Bianca gives the example of the theft of valuables contained in a safe deposit box at a bank, which was perpetrated with the 
complicity of the guards employed by a security agency. The contractual responsibility of the bank towards its clients who have been 
the victims of this theft does not eliminate the responsibility in tort of the thieves and the security agency, which is directly responsible 
towards the bank and the depositors for the criminal activities of its employees. Bianca, M., op. cit., p. 551 fn. 
39 The precise wording of the judgment is 'L-azzjoni fl-ewwel lok ghalhekk kif koncepita ma kellhiex u ma setghetx issir kontra l-konvenut 
Meli' Frendo v. Abela, op. cit., p. 613 
40 'In a nutshell, the essential question usually is whether it is permissible, or legitimate, for the courts to impose tort liability on parties
who are (or one of whom is) involved in some contractual relationships, not necessarily with each other, in such a way that the tort lia­
bility may be added to the burdens or obligations created by the contract', Atiyah, P. S ., ( 1995), An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 
University Press, Oxford, p. 373. 
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nineteenth century, a much more flexible approach has pre­
vailed since the celebrated decision of the House of Lords 
in Donoghue v. Stevenson.41 While the English case-law on
this issue is too complex and convoluted to be examined in 
great depth here, the prevailing approach now is that Y can 
sue Z in tort for compensation of the damages suffered by 
him, provided that: 
1. Z is entitled to benefit from any clause limiting or ex­
empting him from liability in the original contract be­
tween X and Y; and
2. Y can only sue for compensation in cases where he or
his property have suffered direct physical damage and
not where his loss is of a purely economic nature.
Both these provisos shed light on the decision in Frendo v. 
Abela. Concerning the first proviso, a significant judgment 
was delivered in 1975 by the Privy Council in the Eurymedon 
case. This judgment over-ruled previous decisions and accept­
ed that in cases of damage to property consigned by the sea, 
the existence of a clause in the bill of lading exempting third 
parties such as stevedores from liability for damages, also 
exempted these third parties from being sued in tort by the 
buyer of the damaged property.
42 
The facts of this English 
case are analogous to the Maltese one, as in both instances 
the contractual link which existed between the plaintiff and 
another party was held to preclude him from exercising an 
action in tort against a third party. Yet, it is clear that the Eu­
rymedon case was decided on different grounds from Fren­
do v. Abela, as the key issue in this case concerned the effi­
cacy of an exemption clause specifically included in a con­
tract vis-a-vis third parties to that contract. By contrast, there 
was no such exemption clause in the Maltese case and the 
only reason why the contractual action for damages was de­
nied to the plaintiff was due to the expiration of a legally ( and 
not contractually) imposed period of forfeiture.43
Similarly as regards the second proviso, although a super­
ficial reading of the English judgments might conclude that 
they justify the approach of the Maltese court, deeper analy­
sis shows that they do not. In fact the justification for exclud­
ing compensation for pure economic loss under English tort 
law is that 
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a claim for economic loss is often a claim based on a lost ex­
pectation, rather than any other kind of loss.44
To use the words of continental lawyers, it is because eco­
nomic loss represents the positive interest which a party to 
a contract has in seeing it fulfilled more than his negative 
interest not to have entered into a contract at all, that English 
courts are wary of granting damages which represent pure 
economic loss in tort. Thus, in the case of Si,na,an General 
Contracting Co. v. Pilkington Glass,
45 the right to claim dam­
ages in tort was denied to a building contractor who tried to 
sue the suppliers of glass to his subcontractor on the grounds 
that this glass was the wrong colour according to the con­
tract and had to be replaced at his cost. The reason for the 
court's decision was that the loss caused to plaintiff by defen­
dant's carelessness was not physical injury to his person or 
physical damage to his property, but simply the economic 
loss resulting from the non-fulfilment by the defendant of 
his contractual obligations. This decision is superficially sim­
ilar to Frendo v. Abela, as the plaintiff in the Maltese case 
sued the defendant Meli for compensation of the purely fi­
nancial loss caused to him by Meli 's delay in performing 
his obligations under his subcontract with the Cargo Handling 
Company. In reality, however, the damages claimed in the 
Maltese cases were not the purely economic loss reflecting 
plaintiff's expectations under the contract. They were the 
expenses directly caused to the plaintiff as a result of an award 
by a quasi-judicial body (the Ports Disputes Board), which he 
would not have incurred had defendant been diligent in per­
forming his obligations. Consequently, these expenses ap­
pear more similar to physical damage to property than they 
do to pure economic loss and this is probably how an Eng­
lish court would regard them. In any case, it would certain­
ly be incorrect for a Maltese court to argue that compensa­
tion for such expenses cannot be claimed in tort, since the 
'expenses which the latter (the person responsible) may have 
been compelled to incur in consequence of the damage' ,46 
are specifically mentioned in our Civil Code as being dam­
ages for which the plaintiff is entitled to sue for compensa­
tion in tort! 
41 
Delivered in 1932. In that case, the consumer who suffered injuries from drinking a bottle of ginger beer allegedly containing a snail was 
allowed to sue the manufacturer for compensation directly in tort. This action was allowed despite the fact that there was no contrac­
tual linkage between the consumer and the manufacturer, since it was her friend who had bought the bottle of ginger beer and since 
this had been bought from a dealer and not directly from the manufacturer. See Aliyah, ibid., p. 374. 
42 
This case is discussed at length by Atiyah, ibid., pp. 99-100. 
43 
In reality, this English judgment is an application of the principle, accepted by the French courts, that the parties to a contract may decide 
to exclude liability in tort. See the first page of this paper for a discussion of this principle. 
44 
Atiyah, op. cit., p. 380. 
45 
Decided by the Court of Appeal in 1988. Note however that an earlier decision in the Junior Books case allowed an owner of proper-
ty to sue a sub-contractor directly for the negligent construction of a floor, which meant that the floor had to be re-laid. See Atiyah, 
ibid., pp. 382-83. 
46 
See section 1045 (1) of the Civil Code. 
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This analysis leads to one firm conclusion. If the princi­
ple applied in Frendo v. Abela was the principle of privity of 
contract as understood by the English courts, then the court 
construed the English position in an unduly rigid way rem­
iniscent of nineteenth century English case-law. A contem­
porary English court would probably have allowed plaintiff 
to sue the defendant Meli for damages in tort. However, there 
are serious objections to accepting that our courts have relied 
on the English doctrine of privity of contract. After all our 
Civil Code, which was based on the French Code Napoleon, 
contains various provisions concerning the relative effect of 
contracts, which is the Continental analogue to privity of 
contract. Surely it is to these provisions47 and to the ap­
proach of the French courts that we must look for guidance 
in interpreting Frendo v. Abela? Unfortunately however, 
the French approach, while probably correct in terms of our 
Civil Code, does not offer any support for the position 
adopted by our Court of Appeal in this case. The French 
courts would not have prevented the plaintiff in Frendo v. 
Abela from taking action against the defendant Meli on the 
basis of the doctrine of relativity of contract. This is be­
cause, firstly, the plaintiff might not have been considered 
as a third party wholly extraneous to the contract between 
Cargo Handling Company and Meli. Secondly, even if he 
had been so considered, the French courts accept that that 
the principle of contractual relativity does not prevent a 
third party from suing a contracting party in tort for com­
pensation of the damages caused to him as a result of the 
non-performance or misperformance of the contract by one 
of the parties to it.48
Both these points require elucidation. To take the second 
one first, it is clear that the French courts, unlike the English, 
never apply the principle of relativity of the contractual tie to 
preclude the plaintiff from exercising an action in tort against 
one of the parties to a contract to which he is not a party ,49 
to obtain compensation for the damages caused to him by the 
failure of that party to perform her obligations under this con­
tract. This is because they consider that the defendant's fail­
ure to perform her contractual duty may constitute a fault in 
regard to the (third party) plaintiff which is independent of 
her fault in failing to perform her contractual obligations to­
wards the other contracting party. This principle of the inde­
pendence of the two faults means that the French courts, again 
unlike the English ones,
50 will not consider a contractual ex­
emption clause as preventing one party to a contract from ex­
ercising an action in tort against a third party to that contract, 
who has subcontracted to perform the duties of the other con­
tracting party.51 Consequently, had the French courts consid­
ered the plaintiff in Frendo v. Abela as a third party in relation 
to the subcontract between Meli and Cargo Handling com­
pany, then they would also have held that the principle of con­
tractual relativity does not prevent him from suing Meli in tort. 
It is, however, likely that the French courts would not 
have considered the plaintiff in this case as being really a 
third party in regard to the subcontract in question. This is 
because in French law, the particular successor (ayant cause 
a titre particulier), who has bought or otherwise acquired 
property under a contract is 
allowed to enforce rights which, while they have no 'real' char­
acter can be said to be accessory to the thing acquired.52 
Thus, in cases where an object is sold to one person who re­
sells it to another, who in tum resells it, the latest buyer is 
allowed to sue the original supplier or any subsequent seller 
for breach of the warranty of latent defects or that of peaceful 
possession. The same position, according to Caruana Galizia, 
obtains in Maltese law, being based on the principle that the 
rights transferred to one's successor in title over a thing in­
clude actions which one may exercise against third parties in 
regard to the thing transferred.53 In various decisions, the
French Cour de Cassation had extended the application of 
47 That is sections 998-1001 of the Civil Code. The similarity between Maltese and French law is very close in this area. The key prin­
ciple is expressed in French law by article 1165 of the Code Civile, which states 
Les conventions n'ont d'effet qu'entre les parties contractante; elle ne nuisent point au tiers, et elles ne lui profitent que dans le cas 
prevu par l'article 1121. (Chabas, F., op. cit., p. 868). 
In Maltese law, we have section 1001 of our Civil Code, which is almost a word for word translation. 
Contracts shall only be operative as between the contracting parties, and shall not be of prejudice or advantage to third parties except 
in the cases established by law. 
48 In various judgments, the Cour de cassation has observed that 'a failure to discharge a contractual obligation can constitute in relation to 
a third party a fault which entails liability, when this fault has an existence which is independent of the contract'. Quoted in Nicholas, B ., 
op. cit., p. 171. He mentions a case in which the defendant had entered into a contract with the state to incarcerate German prisoners of 
war. His negligent performance of his contractual duties allowed some prisoners to escape and these stole three sheep belonging to plain­
tiff. The defendant was held liable to compensate plaintiff in tort for the loss he had suffered. 
49 Unlike the case where both actions are available against the same person. 
5
° Compare the decision delivered in the Eurymedon case, supra. 
51 See Nicholas, B., op. cit., pp. 171-72. 
52 Ibid., pp. 172-73. 
53 In his notes, Caruana Galizia points out that in cases of breach of the warranty of peaceful possession 
More advantageous is the direct action which doctrine more commonly attributes to the purchaser, by means of which he may tum 
against former sellers 'omisso medio' ... because the immediate author transfers to the person claiming under him, together with the 
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this principle to cases where subcontracts have been made, 
so that: 
The principle was stated to be that where a debtor (in the wide 
French sense of the term) has sub-contracted the performance 
of his obligation, the creditor's claim against this substitute 
debtor is necessarily in contract and is subject to the 'double 
limit' that it cannot exceed either the extent of the creditor's 
rights under his contract with the primary debtor or the extent 
of the substitute debtor's liability under his contract with the 
primary debtor . . .  The principle thus stated is not confined to 
contracts resulting in a transfer of property, but is capable of 
applying to any contract in which the primary debtor sub-con­
tracts the performance of his obligation or part of it.54 
This principle was applied in a remarkable case in which the 
plaintiff had given some slides to a photographic studio for 
enlargement. This studio, in tum, subcontracted the work to 
the defendant, who lost the slides. Plaintiff was not allowed 
to sue the defendant in tort, as the court held that he could 
exercise a contractual action for damages directly against 
the subcontractor and the rule of non cumul forbids the ex­
ercise of the action for damages in tort when a contractual 
action is available against the same person.55 One should,
however, note that a recent decision of the Cour de Cassation 
has approached the issue differently; holding that the action 
of a house owner against the subcontractor of his building 
contractor for compensation of the damages caused to him 
by defects in the plumbing was based on tort and could not 
be deemed to be of a contractual nature.56 While there thus
exists a conflict in the French judgments, it is however cer­
tain that: 
1. no French court is prepared to consider the principle of
contractual relativity as an obstacle to the exercise of an
action in tort by a plaintiff who is a third party to the sub-
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contract against a party to the subcontract; 
2. some decisions hold that in certain circumstances an ac­
tion in contract may also be exercised by this third party
plaintiff; and
3. the only application French courts make of the non cumul
rule in these cases is to prohibit this third party plaintiff
from exercising the action in tort against a party to the
subcontract, where a contractual action was held to be
available to him against this party.
These judgments thus confirm my earlier observation that the 
rule of non cumul, as applied in France, does not apply where 
the contractual and tortious actions are exercisable against 
different persons. They prove beyond any doubt that the de­
cision in Frendo v. Abela does not conform to the French un­
derstanding of either the rule of non cumul,,or the principle 
of relativity of contract. In fact, the judgment in this case held 
that neither an action in tort, nor one in contract was avail­
able to the plaintiff against the subcontractor Meli, thus con­
tradicting all of the French judgments that have been cited.57 
At the same time, they confirm how difficult it is to decipher 
the reasoning of our Court of Appeal in this case. If neither 
the rule of non cumul, nor the principle of relativity of con­
tract, in both its French and English manifestations, can ex­
plain this judgment, then which legal principles could it be 
founded on? 
A closer parallel to the principle invoked by the court in 
both Frendo v. Abela and Vella v. Jones, may lie outside the 
law of tort altogether, in the rules governing the exercise of 
the quasi-contractual remedy of the actio de in rem verso. 
French, Italian and Maltese judgments constantly repeat that 
this actio is a subsidiary action, which may only be utilized 
if no action ex contractu is available to the plaintiff.58 This
principle of subsidiarity is similar to the rule of non cumul. 
thing, all the actions which may belong to him against third parties with regard to the thing itself. 
See Caruana Galizia, V., 'Sale', Civil Law Notes, University Press, Malta, p. 557. An analogous case is perhaps to be found in the inter­
pretation our courts have given to section 1638 of the Civil Code. This concerns the liability of the contractor and the architect under a 
contract of works in cases where the building they have built is in danger of falling to ruin, or actually does fall to ruin, owing to a defect 
in the construction. Our courts have held that the right to sue the contractor and the architect in terms of this section does not only belong 
to the employer but is also transferred to each of his particular successors. See in this regard Michelangelo Bond v. Carmelo Mangion et . 
(LXXV. II. 385); but note that the principle in this case is justified not so much by referring to the theory of accessory rights as to consid­
erations of public policy. In France the basis of this principle is sometimes traced to article 1122 of the Code Civile, which states, 'On 
est cense avoir stipule pour soi et pour ses heritiers et ayants cause, a moins que le contraire ne soit exprime ou ne resulte de la na­
ture de la convention.' Chabas, F., op. cit., p. 870. The Maltese Civil Code also states, in section 998, 
Every person shall be deemed to have promised or stipulated for himself, for his heirs and for the persons claiming through or 
under him, unless the contrary is expressly established by law, or agreed upon between the parties, or appears from the nature of 
the agreement. 
54 Nicholas, B., op. cit., p. 174. 
55 See the judgment of the Cassation of the 8th March 1988, cited in Nicholas, B., ibid.
56 
The decision was given by the Cassation on the 12th July 1991. See Chabas, F., op. cit., pp. 882-83.
57 In Frendo v. Abela, the court mentioned that plaintiff seemed to be claiming contractual damages from the third party Meli as part of its
argument for dismissing his action as legally unfounded! 
58 
For a learned and interesting discussion of the actio de in rem verso in comparative law, see Zwiegert, K. & Kotz, H. (1998), An Intro­
duction to Comparative Law, University Press, Oxford, pp. 537-65. One should also note that our case decisions are divided as to whether 
the availability of an action in tort or quasi-tort would also prevent the making of the quasi-contractual action. In Scicluna v. Watson 
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In either case, the courts do not permit recourse to be had to 
the action for damages, whether in tort or in quasi-contract, 
if the plaintiff could previously have utilized a contractual ac­
tion for damages, which he allowed to lapse through prescrip­
tion. Like the rule of non cumul, the principle of subsidiarity 
is not meant to allow the plaintiff to circumvent the law of 
prescription. However the principle of subsidiarity, being based 
on equity, is less rigidly applied than the rule of non cumul. 
There exist, in fact, a series of cases in which both the French 
and the Maltese courts have permitted the plaintiff to exer­
cise the actio de in rem verso despite the fact that he could have 
exercised a contractual action for damages against another 
party, if he proves to the court's satisfaction that the con­
tractual action was bound to be unsuccessful in compensating 
him for the damages he sustained. The leading case in Malta 
is Said v. Testa/errata Bonnici, decided by the Civil Court 
on the 161h June 1936 (XXIX. II. 1105).59 In this case, Said,
the plaintiff, had supplied Pace with wood, beams and paint 
for improving a tenement he leased which belonged to Testa­
ferrata Bonnici. These materials were utilized for this purpose. 
Subsequently Pace was declared insolvent and it became clear 
that although Said could exercise a contractual action against 
him for payment, this action could not result in his receiv­
ing adequate financial compensation. Consequently, the court 
permitted Said to exercise the actio de in rem verso against 
Testaferrata Bonnici to obtain compensation on the basis of 
unjustified enrichment. 
It is worth pointing out that the factual situation in Said 
v. Testa/ errata Bonnici was comparable to that of Frendo v.
Abela since in both cases the plaintiff could initially have
exercised a contractual action against one person and the point
at issue was whether this precluded him from exercising an­
other action (in tort or quasi-contract) against another per­
son. The comparison becomes even closer when we consid­
er certain French cases where the plaintiff was allowed to
exercise the quasi-contractual action after he had unsuccess­
fully attempted to exercise his contractual action for dam­
ages. Thus, Mazeaud & Chabasw cite the case of a building
contractor who was employed by the buyer of a house to
cany out certain structural improvements to the property. Sub­
sequently, the buyer having been declared insolvent, he did
not pay either the price of the house he had bought to the
seller nor the cost of the repairs he had commissioned to the
contractor. The contractor initially sued the buyer of the house
ex contractu for his fees. However, this action was not sue-
cessful because the buyer was insolvent. Subsequently, the 
French court allowed the contractor to exercise the actio de 
in rem verso against the seller of the house, who had mean­
while successfully rescinded the contract of sale and recov­
ered possession of the house together with the structural im­
provements. 
At this point, the circle closes and it becomes clear why 
the court in Frendo v. Abela referred to the plaintiff's action 
in tort against the second defendant as one which he could 
only exercise after having first sued the first defendant for 
breach of contract. The principle being applied here appears to 
be the principle of subsidiarity and not the rule of non cumul, 
as this principle permits the plaintiff to institute the quasi­
contractual action against a third party after he has initially 
and unsuccessfully, attempted to sue another person for breach 
of contract. By contrast the rule of non cumul would prob­
ably, as has been seen, not apply to this situation where the 
actions in contract and in tort are exercisable against differ­
ent persons. Moreover, if it did apply, it would permanently 
prevent the plaintiff from making the action in tort against 
the third party, as this would be considered to be the logical 
effect of the mere existence of a contractual action, whether 
this action had been successfully exercised or not. This is not 
the stance adopted in Frendo v. Abela, where the judgment 
implied that the plaintiff might have been allowed to exer­
cise the action ex quasi delicto against a third party (Meli) had 
he initially sued the first defendant (Abela nomine) for breach 
of contract and had this contractual action been unsuccess­
ful due to a cause such as the insolvency of the defendant. 
Finally, the judgment qualified this statement by asserting that 
this action in tort could, however, never be availed of in a 
situation where the plaintiff had allowed the contractual ac­
tion to become time-barred through the operation of prescrip­
tion. This distinction, which centres on whether or not the con­
tractual action was time-barred, makes sense in the context of 
the principle of subsidiarity. As has been seen, this princi­
ple allows the plaintiff to exercise the actio de in rem verso if 
she proves that her contractual action would have been un­
successful but not if the reason why the contractual action can­
not be successfully exercised is due to her inactivity, which 
allowed the contractual action to become time-barred through 
the operation of prescription. The distinction makes no sense 
in the light of the principle of non cumul, which applies re­
gardless of whether the contractual action was time-barred 
or not. 
(XVIII . I. 26) and Mattocks v. McKean (LXXIII. IV. 1019) the courts took a more liberal view, while in Buttigieg v. Bartolo (XXVI-
11. II. 355) and Bugeja v. Micallef(XXXIV. II. 784) they argued that the quasi-contractual action could not be made in these instances.
59 Reference should also be made to Tanna v. Cachia ?.ammit (XXXV. I. 805), where a contractor of works who had been employed by one co­
owner was granted the right to exercise the actio de in rem verso against the others, despite the fact that he possessed a contractual right 
of action only against his employer. 
60 See Chabas, F., op. cit., pp. 830-31.
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The conclusion appears inescapable. The court in Frendo 
v. Abela applied the principle of subsidiarity, which plays a
restricted role in regard to the quasi-contract of unjustified
enrichment, as a general principle operative in the separate
and unrelated domain of tort law. In so doing, it ignored the
fact that this principle has no basis in our law of tort and that
a different principle, that of non cumul, already governs this
field in French law. The judgment in Vella v. Jones can also
be construed along the same lines.61 This application of the
principle of subsidiarity to situations of concurrent liability
between contract and tort appears to be incorrect, because this
principle is founded on a different basis from the rule of non
cumul. While the rule of non cumul is rooted in the respect
shown by French law to the autonomous will of the contract­
ing parties, the principle of subsidiarity is based on the idea
that the actio de in rem verso, being an equitable remedy,
should only be allowed as a last resort. Moreover, the legal
effects of subsidiarity are different from those of non cumul.
In Frendo v. Abela, the rule of non cumul would still have
allowed the plaintiff to recover the damages he sustained from
the person who was effectively responsible for causing them.
This seems a more just and logical outcome than effectively
refusing compensation on the strength of a misplaced reliance
on the principle of subsidiarity.
Adopting the Italian Approach? 
If the judgments previously considered seem to apply the non 
cumul rule, albeit for the wrong reasons (Vassallo v. Miu.i), 
or in the wrong way (Frendo v. Abela), the final judgment to 
be reviewed is one which seems to have gone in the opposite 
direction. This was given in Saviour Farrugia nomine v. 
Emanuel Znhra, Tarcisio Galea and Anthony Montebello, de­
cided by the Civil Court on the 31st October 1996 (LXXX. 
ID. 1321). In this case plaintiff, Telemalta Corporation, had 
entered into a contract with defendants Emanuel Zahra and 
Tarcisio Galea, in terms of which they had to carry our cer­
tain excavation work, involving the digging of certain trench-
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es. According to the contract, defendants were allowed to 
subcontract this work to third parties. Subsequently defen­
dants subcontracted with A. Montebello Ltd., which agreed 
to perform the work. In the course of the excavations, a cable 
belonging to Telemalta Corporation itself was exposed and 
damaged, costing the Corporation LM485 .00 to repair. After 
it paid the defendants Zahra and Galea for the work they had 
carried out, the Corporation proceeded to sue them, together 
with Montebello to recover the damages it had suffered. In 
their defence, Zahra and Galea pleaded that they were not re­
sponsible for the damage caused, since they had subcontract­
ed the work and were not even aware of the damage. Defen­
dant Anthony Montebello pleaded that the damage was not 
imputable to him, since he had no legal relationship �ith the 
plaintiff, for whom he had not carried out any work on a per­
sonal basis.62
In its judgment, the court considered whether the payment 
plaintiff made to the defendants Zahra and Galea constituted 
an obstacle to his claim. It held that it did not, since 
il-fatt Ii l-atturi hallsu lil Tarcisio Constructions Limited min­
ghajr ma naqqsulhom xejn, bl-ebda mod ma jissinifika. Ii huma 
ma kellhomx dritt Ii jipprocedu kontra 1-konvenuti ex delicto 
ghal xi hsara Ii dawn kienu ghamlu. lnfatti ... dan kien ii-mod 
korrett kif kellhom jimxu 1-atturi fis-sens illi kellhom ihallsu 
Iii dak Ii kien imqabbad bit-tender ghall-prezz ta' xoghlu, im­
baghad imexxu gudizzjarjament biex jithallsu tad-danni Ii 
kienu gew Whom ikka.gunatt.63
Since it had classified plaintiff's action as based on tort, the 
court proceeded to examine whether this action could succeed 
against any of the defendants. As regards the defendant Mon­
tebello, the court observed that it was the company A. Monte­
bello Ltd. and not the defendant personally which had sub­
contracted to carry out the work. Apparently implying that 
it was possible for a legal person, such as a company, to be 
held responsible for committing a tort, the court held that even 
if this possibility did not exist and plaintiff had therefore cor­
rectly sued Montebello personally,64 plaintiff nevertheless had
61 Depending on how one interprets the court's statement in that case that an action for pre-contractual damages could not be made once
the plaintiff had not utilized the contractual action which was available to him. If one reads this statement to mean that pre-contractual 
liability is based on tort and that the plaintiff could only have sued in tort had he first, unsuccessfully, tried to exercise the contractual 
action, then the court's position in Vella v. Jones is identical to that adopted in Frendo v. Abela. However, if one reads this statement to 
mean that pre-contractual liability is based on quasi-contract, then the judgment is a straightforward and correct application of the princi­
ple of subsidiarity. 
62 He also pleaded that since the Magistrate's court had held that his actions did not constitute a criminal contravention, he could not be found 
liable to pay civil damages. However, the Civil court rejected this argument, since the civil and criminal actions are independent of one 
another. 
63 
Farrugia nomine v. 'Zahra et, op. cit., p. 1324. 
64 That this was the correct approach is suggested by the case of Anthony Bugeja v. Carmelo Agius et (LXXV. ll. 418). In that case, the Court · 
of Appeal held that while no moral person can commit a tort, all the physical persons who participate, via acts of commission or omission, 
in torts or quasi-torts are liable in damages. The plaintiff in this case was therefore allowed to personally sue every member of the gov­
erning committee of a band club for compensation of the damages caused to him by an explosion resulting from an illegal activity that 
took place in the club premises. 
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to prove that Montebello was personally responsible for caus­
ing the damage complained of, in line with the general prin­
ciples of tort law. As this proof had not been made, defendant 
Montebello could not be held liable in tort. As regards defen­
dants Zahra and Galea, the court made reference to the prin­
ciples of indirect responsibility in tort so as to establish whether 
they could be held liable for having subcontracted with Mon­
tebello Ltd. In terms of section 1037 of the Civil Code, to 
succeed in his suit the plaintiff had to prove that these defen­
dants had employed a person 'who is incompetent, or whom 
he has not reasonable grounds to consider competent. '65 As 
the plaintiff had not proved either of these criteria of incom­
petence, the court also refused his claim for damages against 
defendants Zahra and Galea. 
The decision in Farrugia v. Zahra contrasts with that 
given in Frendo v. Abela and with various French judgments. 
In Frendo v. Abela, the court had not allowed one contracting 
party to sue the subcontractor of the other contracting party 
in tort. This was permitted in this case. In Frendo v. Abela,
the court had held that the only action available to the plaintiff 
was a contractual action against the other contracting party. In 
this case the court allowed the plaintiff to sue the other con­
tracting party in tort. While the Frepch judgments previous­
ly discussed had held that the pl�_!iff had a contl!ctual astion 
for dam!ges directly against the s�t.?..contractor, the court in this 
case held that the plaintiff could only sue the subcontractor in 
tort. 
This judgment could be interpreted as a clear statement 
that the non cumul rule does not apply in Maltese law. After 
all, the judge classified the plaintiff's action as tortious with­
out considering that he might have been trying to sue defen­
dants Zahra and Galea for breach of contract. Indeed, plain­
tiff might not have suffered damage had these defendants 
chosen a different method to give effect to their contractual 
obligations towards him. On the other hand, one might argue 
that the contractual responsibility of the defendants did not 
arise in this case and there was therefore no overlap between 
their liability in tort and in contract. If there were no concur­
rent responsibility, this judgment could have no relevance to 
the issue under discussion. To settle this question, it is neces­
sary to determine whether the plaintiff could have sued any of 
the defendants for breach of contract or whether there were 
any special factors that excluded their contractual responsibil­
ity. 
The first point to be considered is whether the act or omis­
sion that caused the damage to plaintiff's property constitut­
ed a breach of any of the defendants' contractual obligations. 
This is by no means clear in this case, as defendants Zahra 
and Galea could object that they had carried out the excava­
tion work that they had contracted with Telemalta Corpora­
tion to do, as proved by the fact that this Corporation had paid 
them for it. The fact that in the course of the work a cable 
belonging to Telemalta itself was exposed and damaged did 
not mean that they had not diligently performed their duties 
under the contract, since this contract had not expressly im­
posed on them a duty to protect the plaintiff's property while 
carrying out the excavation work. While this argument may 
appear to be sound, it is important to note that it does not con­
form to the approach adopted by French and Italian courts 
to this issue and that their approach has strong persuasive 
authority, since it is based on legal provisions that also exist 
in our Civil Code. In fact French courts have held that the 
obligations arising under a contract are not limited to those 
explicitly agreed upon between the parties, but also include 
implied accessory duties, since contracts in French law also 
have effect in regard to: 'toutes les suites que l'equite, ['usage
ou la loi donnent a ['obligation' .66 The French courts have 
therefore accepted that in various cases duties of protection, 
which they term 'obligations de securite', may oblige one 
party to a contract to protect the person or the property of 
other contracting parties. They have thus held that a building 
contractor who performs construction works is bound by a 
duty of protection not to cause any damage to the property 
that belongs to his client.67 This principle would appear to 
apply to Farrugia v. Zahra, as this case also dealt with a con­
tract of works (locatio operas) and as our Civil Code, in sec­
tion 993, also provides that contracts are binding; 'not only 
in regard to the matter therein expressed, but also in regard 
to any consequence which, by equity, custom or law, is inci­
dental to the obligation, according to its nature'. Consequent­
ly there would appear to have been nothing to prevent the 
court from following the lead of the French judgments and 
concluding that defendants Zahra and Galea were in breach 
of their implied contractual duty to protect the property of the 
plaintiff, Telemalta Corporation and that plaintiff could there­
fore exercise a contractual action for damages against them. 
The argument that a concurrent contractual liability exist­
ed in Farrugia v. Zahra gains added reinforcement from the 
65 This section was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Dr Joseph R. Grech v. Commissioner of Police (LXXII. II. 199) In that case the 
court held that this section presents two alternative tests of incompetence: purely objective incompetence at the moment when the per­
son is employed and a more subjective test, which requires that the specific employe; in question did not have reasonable grounds to 
consider the particular employee involved as incompetent. 
66 According to article 1135 of the Code Civil. See Chabas, F., op. cit., pp. 396-401. 
67 Ibid, p. 400.
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views of Italian scholars like Di Majo or Massimo Bianca. 
Both authors note that the existence of these ancillary con­
tractual 'obligations de securite'' which they term 'obblighi
di protezione', has also been accepted in Italy. Di Majo argues 
that the recognition of this category of obligations reflects the 
fluidity of the boundary between contractual and extra-con­
tractual responsibility, since these obligations impose duties 
to protect the person or the property of the contracting parties 
that are not expressly mentioned in the contract.68 Massimo
Bianca provides an alternative juridical basis for these obliga­
tions, arguing that these 'obblighi di protezione' do not con­
stitute a separate category of obligations, but should rather 
be seen as emerging from the general rule that all obligations 
must be performed with the diligence of a bonus pate,famil­
ias .69 Thus, my duty to take care of the property of my credi­
tor would emerge from my legally defined duty to diligently 
perform my contractual obligations.70 This approach could
also conceivably have been adopted by our Civil Court in 
Farrugia v. 'Z£lhra, since the Maltese Civil Code also contains 
the general rule requiring the diligence of a bonus pate,f a­
milias in the performance of a contractual obligation.71 
This review of French and Italian law suggests that Far­
rugia v. 'Z£lhra might well have been classified as a case of 
breach of contract, had the court been so inclined. However 
there are various other objections to this thesis. One of these 
stems from the fact that defendants Zahra and Galea had sub­
contracted the performance of their contractual obligation to 
A. Montebello Ltd. Since they were allowed to subcontract in
terms of the original contract and since it was the subcon­
tractor who actually caused the damage, it might be thought
that these defendants could not be found liable for breaching
their contract with the plaintiff. This argument, while tempt-
DAVID E. ZAMMIT 
ing, would be wrong. Our courts have on various occasions 
held that the fact that the contractor in a contract of works 
has subcontracted the performance of his obligation to a third 
party does not exempt him from his responsibility towards his 
employer for the diligent performance of his contractual oblig­
ations.72 This is also the opinion of Caruana Galizia, who ar­
gues that where the contractor has subcontracted the execu­
tion of the work, 'the contractor, evident! y, does not thereby 
deprive himself of the quality of a contractor and is not dis­
charged from his obligations, unless the employer acknowl­
edges the sub-contractor' .73 It seems that the acknowledge­
ment to which Caruana Galizia is referring is an express ac­
knowledgement of a specific subcontractor, which cannot be 
inferred from the fact that the contract of works in this case 
allowed the contractor to subcontract the performance of his 
contractual obligations. This continuing contractual respon­
sibility of the contractor for the fault of his subcontractor is 
in line with the judgment in Frendo v. Abela. It conforms to 
various other cases in which our courts have held that a party 
who assumes a contractual obligation knowing that its per­
formance depends on a third party will remain responsible 
for the performance of this obligation.74 
Other critics would accept that the facts in Farrugia vs
'Z£lhra constituted a breach of contract and that defendants 
Zahra and Galea were not exempted from their contractual 
responsibility to protect Telemalta Corporation's property 
simply because they had subcontracted the performance of 
their duties to a third party. However they would object that 
since plaintiff had paid these defendants for their work, this 
prevented him from suing them for breach of contract. Alter­
natively, they might claim that in this case the rules for com­
pensation of contractual damages did not permit the plaintiff 
68 Di Majo,A., (1997), La Responsabilita Contrattuale, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, pp. 91-92. 
69 Bianca, M., (1994), Diritto Civile Vol. IV, Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, Milano, pp. 93-95.
70 
The Italian courts have even accepted that my contractual duty to protect the person or property of my creditor also entitles third parties 
to the contract to exercise a contractual right of action for compensation against me. In this way these third parties may obtain com­
pensation for any damage to their person which results from my non-compliance with these obligations of protection. Cf. Di Majo, 
op. cit., pp. 184-190.
71 See sections 1032 and 1132 of our Civil Code.
72 See, for instance, Joseph 2.arb v. Carmelo Agius (XLI. II. 892), where the principle was stated to be
Jekk l-opra, li kienet oggett ta' l-appalt, giet eiegwita minn persuna onra bnala subappaltatur, l-appaltatur jibqa' responsabbli 
lejn l-appaltant gnall-eiekuzzjoni ta' l-appalt, anki apparti mill-fatt li l-materjal fzaiin ikunfornieh hu. 
This principle was quoted approvingly and applied in Emanuel Abela v. Perit Arkitett Fred Valentino et. (LXXXII. II. 1202).
73 
See Caruana Galizia, V., rev. Ganado, Prof. J.M., (1987), 'The Contract of Letting and Hiring', Notes on Civil Law Vol. /Jl, Univer­
sity Press, Malta, p. 765. This is a different case from that mentioned in fn. 53 of this paper.
74 
This principle was stated in these terms in John Falzon v. Silvio Mifsud (XLIV. I. 329) 
jekk l-obligat jassumi l-obligazzjoni meta kien jaf Ii l-eiekuzzjoni tagnha kienet tiddependi mill-fatt tat-terz, mingnajr ma jistipula 
ebda klawsola ta' eioneru,filjatt hu jkun qiegned iwiegned il-fatt tieghu, u mhu.x il-fatt tat-terz; ghax assuma obligazzjoni li tabil­
fors kienet tikkomprendi l-fatt tat-terz. 
It was cited in Albert Farrugia v. Michael Attard pro et nae (LXXXII. II. 52), where the court held that a contractual obligation to repair a 
car includes an obligation to compensate for the damages caused by the delay in repairing the car, even if this was due to the delay of 
the third party who supplied the parts. 
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to recover the damages he suffered from the defendant.75
However, as discussed earlier in this paper,76 each of these 
objections is beside the point. If the court had applied the 
non cumul rule and if the act of the defendants constituted 
a breach of contract, then the plaintiff could not have been 
permitted to sue them in tort even though he could not obtain 
compensation by exercising the contractual action. This oc­
curred in the other Maltese cases reviewed in this paper, where 
although plaintiff could not exercise the contractual action, 
the court nevertheless held that the fact that this action had 
been available to him at some point prevented him from ex­
ercising the action in tort. 
Thus it seems clear that if one accepts that defendants 
Zahra and Galea were in prima facie breach of their contrac­
tual obligations, then the court's decision to allow the plain­
tiff to sue them in tort implies that the rule of non cumul is 
not followed in Maltese law. At this stage, however, two clar­
ifications must be made to my argument. Firstly it might be 
thought that the argument is rather weak, since it hinges on 
the possibility that the court in this case might have found 
that a contractual action for breach of defendants' duties of 
protection existed under Maltese law. If this possibility did 
, not really exist, then there would have been no overlap be­
tween defendants' contractual and tortious responsibilities and 
the court's decision could have no relevance to the issue of non 
cumul. However this objection misses the point. It is not the 
court's decision that a contractual action was not available 
which is being attacked, but rather the fact that the court did 
not even consider whether or not a contractual action was 
available to the plaintiff, in addition to his action in tort. It 
is submitted that the court would have been compelled to con­
sider and pronounce itself on this issue if the rule of non cumul 
had existed in our system. How else could the court decide 
whether to allow the action in tort, if not by first ascertaining 
whether there was a concurrent contractual responsibility?77 
Secondly, doubts may arise concerning the practical relevance 
of this discussion. These will be silenced if one considers that 
in this case the court's decision, had it applied the rule of non 
cumul, could easily have been the opposite of what it was. It 
will be recalled that the primary reason why the court refused 
the plaintiff's action in Farrugia v. Zahra was that he had 
failed to prove the fault of the defendants according to the 
rules of tort. However, if the court had concluded that the 
defendants were in breach of their contractual obligations, 
then the onus of proof would have shifted to them and it is 
the defendants who would have had to show why they were 
not at fault for the breach. Had they failed to exculpate them­
selves by providing additional proof, they would have been 
held responsible to compensate plaintiff for the damage caused 
to his cable. The practical point of this debate is clear. 
The conclusion is that the Civil Court in this case adopted 
an approach which contrasts dramatically with the other judg­
ments which have been reviewed. This approach appears to 
be similar to that adopted by the Italian courts, since it makes 
no reference to the rule of non cumul and seems to accept 
that in cases of concurrent responsibility the court may freely 
decide whether to classify the action as contractual or tortious. 
Conclusion 
This review of Maltese judgments has revealed three differ­
ent approaches to the rule of non cumul. These can be sum­
marized as 
a. a 'consequentialist' interpretation of the rule that uses the
criteria governing the payment of contractual damages to
determine when plaintiff's action is contractual;
b. an alternative interpretation that construes the rule in terms
of the principle of subsidiarity of the actio de in rem verso;
and
c. a rejection of the rule which reflects the Italian approach.
In response to the question that inspired this paper, one can
therefore say that while the Maltese courts do not expressly
refer to the rule of non cumul, they have sometimes stated
similar principles to deal with situations of concurrent lia­
bility. Yet although these principles may have similar effects,
they are couched in a different form than the non cumul rule
and may also have very different effects. Overall the Maltese
position is characterized by the uncertainty resulting from the
courts' reliance on shifting and occasionally contradictory
principles. This is clearly an unsatisfactory situation and it
would appear preferable if our courts were to articulate and
consistently adhere to a clear position by either adopting the
rule in full or rejecting it. If the Maltese courts were to con­
sistently reject the rule, then this would clearly benefit the
plaintiff, allowing him/her the choice whether to act in tort or
in contract depending on which type of action appears most
favourable. This would appear to be equitable, although it
might be difficult to reconcile this position with a strict in­
terpretation of the theory of the autonomy of the will of the
75 It might perhaps be argued that these rules do not cover a situation where the plaintiff, who accepts to pay the defendant in full for the 
adequate performance of his contractual duties also wishes to bring an action for damages against this defendant. 
76 Refer to the discussion of the judgments given in Vassallo v. Mizzi and Fenech v. Baldacchino, in section headed 'The "Consequential­
ist" Approach of Vassallo v. Mizzi', of this paper. 
77 Indeed, if there had been no concurrent contractual responsibility, the court would have been obliged to ascertain the reasons for this. 
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If the parties had specifically excluded their contractual responsibility, then this might also affect their responsibility in tort. On this 
see Mazeaud, op. cit. in section headed "Non cumul' in Comparative Law of Tort' of this paper. 
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contracting parties. If on the other hand our courts were to 
accept this rule in toto, then this would also benefit the plain­
tiff, while ensuring that the criteria followed by our courts 
are logical and knowable in advance. 
The practical effects of either of these approaches may 
also be gauged from the impact each would have had on the 
cases reviewed in this paper. Rejecting the non cumul rule, 
while consistent with the court's approach in Farrugia v. Zahra,
would probably also have left the outcome unaffected in Vas­
sallo v. Mizzi and Fenech v. Baldacchino. In each of these 
cases the plaintiff failed to provide adequate proof of his claim 
and the need to prove the case would still have existed if his 
claim had been classified as tortious. The decision in Frendo
v. Abela, which was criticized as unduly restrictive, is the
only decision which would have been overturned had our
courts adopted the Italian approach and rejected the rule in
question. Again, accepting the rule would have left the deci­
sions in Vassallo v. Mizzi and Fenech v. Baldacchino unaffect­
ed, while it would probably have overturned the decisions in
Frendo v. Abela and Farrugia v. Zahra, which were both crit­
icized in this paper.
Leaving the non cumul rule in a state of suspended ani­
mation may produce other, more insidious, effects. As F arru­
gia v. Zahra shows, leaving the classification of an action to 
the arbitrary discretion of the court may encourage the court 
to classify the action as one of tort in a case which might other­
wise have been categorized as a breach of contract. This re­
duces the court's motivation to develop our law of contract, 
by exploring whether implicit contractual duties of protection 
can exist in our civil law. Our law of tort may also be suffer­
ing from the effect of the misleading principle developed in 
Vassallo v. Mizzi, which classifies an action as contractual if 
its facts satisfy the legal criteria for compensation of contrac­
tual damages. This influenced the court in Fenech v. Baldacc­
hino to go a step further and import the distinction between 
fraudulent and negligent breach of contract in order to classi-
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fy the action as contractual or tortious. In that case the court 
went so far as to imply that a fraudulent breach of contract is 
a kind of tort! This clearly distorts the relationship between 
contract and tort. 
In this light, it is interesting to consider the recent decision 
by the Court of Appeal in the case of Victor Shaw et noe v. John
Aquilina noe, delivered on the 2ih March 1996 (LXXX. II. 
623). In this case, the first court seems to have implicitly re-
f erred to the rules regulating the payment of con�actual dam­
ages in order to interpret the rules regulating the payment of 
damages in tort, despite the significant differences that exist 
between these two sets of rules. Since 1962, in fact, Maltese 
tort legislation has made no distinction between the negligent 
and intentional causing of damage, insofar as the liability of the t
offender to compensate the victim both for damnum emergens
and for lucrum cessans is concerned.78 By contrast, as has al­
ready been observed,79 the rules regulating the payment of con­
tractual damages distinguish between fraudulent ( or intention-
al) and negligent breach of contract and it is only in the former 
case that they permit unrestricted compensation of all the dam­
ages directly caused by the breach. In Shaw v. Aquilina, the 
first court held that in the case of a quasi-tort consisting of 
the negligent omission of due maintenance of electrical equip­
ment, the damages payable to the victim could only be 're­
stricted real damages', excluding lucrum cessans. In a state­
ment that was quoted approvingly by the Court of Appeal,80 
the first court justified this stance by pointing out, inter alia,
that in this case defendant had nq_t committed the damage in­
tentionally. While various explanations can be given for the 
court's approach,81 they are not mutually exclusive and it does 
not seem too far-fetched to argue that the court was also (un­
duly) influenced by the rules governing the payment of con­
tractual damages.After all there appears to be little basis in our 
present law of tort for the a priori exclusion of compensation 
for damages consisting in lucrum cessans whenever the of­
fender has acted negligently. This interpretation of the rules of 
78 On this see Caruana Galizia, (1978), op. cit., p. 316A. 
79 See note number 18 in this paper.
80 But one should note that the judgment ofthe Court of Appeal was confined to the assessment of damages, as plaintiff did not appeal 
from that part of the first court's judgment that established defendant's responsibility in quasi-tort. 
81 The first court's approach can also be explained by noting that it based its decision on the fact that the defendant was liable for commit­
ting a quasi-tort on section 1031 of our Civil Code. This section, unlike section 1033, does not expressly mention that the act or omission 
constituting the tort or quasi-tort must be in breach of a legally imposed duty. Section I 031 states that the offender will only be liable for 
'the damage' which he causes, unlike section 1033, which states that he will be liable for 'any damage'. Thus, section 1031 seems to offer 
a lower level of compensation to the victim than section 1033. Alternatively, one can explain the court's approach as based on obsolete 
legal principles. This explanation is suggested by the date of the case decision cited in the judgment, which stated that the damages that 
can be compensated where damage is negli�ently caused are limited to the damnum emergens. The case was Luigi Gusman v. Dr Paolo
Boffa, decided by the Civil Court on the 27 February 1935 (XX.IX. II. 368). In 1935, Maltese statutes specifically excluded the possi­
bility of compensation of lucrum cessans in cases where damage is negligently caused. However, they were amended in 1938 to allow 
compensation of lucrum cessans in these cases too, up to a limit of £1,200. In 1962, even this limit was removed. On this see Cini, J. A., 
(1997) 'Traditional and New Appro�ches to the Problem of the Assessment of Damages in Fatal and Personal Injury Claims', LLD dis­
sertation, (unpublished). 
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tortious liability becomes more comprehensible if it is seen as 
yet another import from the law of contract, following in the 
trail of Fenech v. Baldacchino.
Finally it should be obseived that the bad effects of the pre­
sent lack of clarity concerning non cumul go beyond a lack 
of legal certainty, possible denials of justice and the distorted 
development of both our tort and our contract law. This situ­
ation is constantly creating difficulties for practising lawyers 
who have to draft writs or other written pleadings. To fully un­
derstand these difficulties, it is important to note one critical 
characteristic of our court judgments which operates when­
ever there is a case of concurrent liability and it is unclear 
whether the claim should best be treated under tort or con­
tract. In these cases, the judgment almost invariably describes 
the decision to classify the action under one category or the 
other as a search for and discovery of the real intentions of 
the plaintiff, who is treated as the only authority able to 
classify his action. This means, firstly, that in a case where 
plaintiff has specifically requested damagesJor tort or for 
breach of contract, the court usually feels bound by this re­
quest and does not consider itself free to re-classify the case 
in the way that is most favourable to his claim. Given the 
prevailing uncertainty as to whether we follow the rule of 
non cumul and how we are to interpret this rule, it is obvi­
ous that difficulties will arise whenever there is any hint of 
a possible situation of concurrent liability. In this situation, 
filing an action asking specifically for compensation based 
on tort can expose a client to the risk of having his claim re-
fused on the grounds that he should have sued for breach of 
contract, at least 'initially' .82 Clearly the same situation can 
happen in reverse, when a client sues specifically on the 
basis of breach of contract, only to be told that his action 
might have succeeded had he sued for damages in tort. 
82 As in Frendo v. Abela, op. cit. 
83 On this point, Bianca, M., (op. cit., p. 555) observes 
The client may prefer to hedge his bets by requesting dam­
ages on b_2!h tortious and contractual grounds, perhaps by 
making one claim subsidiary to the other. However, the rule 
of non cumul would prevent him from making such claims 
and he may also encounter another obstacle, which is that 
the courts do not always admit that situations of concurrent 
liability have arisen. The claim in tort may be viewed as legal­
ly incompatible with the claim in contract, requiring that two 
separate actions be filed. In this context, it is not surprising 
that most clients prefer not to commit themselves and sim­
ply make a claim for damages, without further specifying the 
legal basis of their claim. This might seem to be the best solu­
tion, because it leaves the final decision as to the legal classi­
fication of the claim in the hands of the judge, who will pre­
sumably exercise his discretion in a way that is favourable 
to the plaintiff. However, the judge may still conceive of his 
role as being that of discerning the plaintiff's (unstated) inten­
tions to ascertain the legal basis of his claim and not that of 
exercising his personal discretion in the interests of the plain­
tiff. In that event, it is possible that the judge will classify the 
action in a manner prejudicial to plaintiff's claim.83 Here too, 
therefore the situation would be vastly improved if we had 
a definitive pronouncement clearly establishing whether or 
not we possess the rule of non cumul in our civil law. 
The conclusion can be stated succinctly. The lack of clear 
guidelines to handle situations of concurrent liability is pro­
ducing various harmful effects on both our substantive and 
procedural law. It is helping to create situations in which cit­
izens are denied access to justice. We need to reform our sys­
tem, if necessary by ad hoc legislation, to ensure that these 
situations do not continue to multiply. 
Se l'attore chiede il risarcimento del danno sofferto adducendo entrambi ifatti e senza ojfrire elementi per l'ulteriore specificazione 
della domanda, il giudice determina a sua scelta il tipo dell'azione eserr:itata ... Il potere di scelta del giudice deve tuttavia ammet­
tersi anche se implica una decisione riservata all' autonomia della parte. 
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